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ABSTRACT
Medical, psychological, educational and social
interventions to modify the behaviour of autistic people
are only justiﬁed if they confer beneﬁt on those people.
However, it is not clear how ‘beneﬁt’ should be
understood. Most such interventions are justiﬁed by
referring to the prospect that they will effect lasting
improvements in the well-being and happiness of autistic
people, so they can lead good lives. What does a good
life for an autistic person consist in? Can we assume
that his or her well-being is substantively the same as
the well-being of non-autistic individuals? In this paper,
we argue that, as it stands, the current approach to the
study of well-being is for the most part unable to
answer these questions. In particular, much effort is
needed in order to improve the epistemology of well-
being, especially so if we wish this epistemology to be
‘autism-sensitive’. Towards the end of the paper, we
sketch a new, autism-sensitive approach and apply it in
order to begin answering our initial questions.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we examine the role of theories of
well-being in justifying interventions intended to
modify the behaviour of autistic people, especially
those delivered by or on behalf of parents raising
autistic children.i The question of what gives autis-
tic lives value is much discussed currently, in aca-
demic, policy and public contexts, and increasingly
the voices of autistic people themselves are achiev-
ing prominence. At the heart of these discussions
are difﬁcult controversies about who has a say in
deﬁning well-being, about how far interventions
should aim at ‘normalising’ the behaviour of autis-
tic people and about trade-offs between short-term
and long-term beneﬁts, especially where interven-
tions are seen to involve both beneﬁts and harms to
autistic people.
We are writing as ourselves parents of autistic
children, who have wrestled with these issues per-
sonally as well as philosophically. Actively thinking
about well-being from our role as parents, as well
as academic philosophers, affords an entry point to
the study of well-being that is rather untrodden. We
ask questions about well-being from the point of
view of a practice, that is, parenting children with
autism, centrally animated by the concept of well-
being. We claim that this practice-based approach
enables us to ask the important questions about
well-being that are at issue in this paper, to show
why the current philosophical approach to the
study of well-being cannot answer these questions
and to explain how this approach can be amended
so as to be able to address these questions.
Finally, while in this paper we focus on autism,
we should like to think autism as a ‘case study’ of
sorts for a broader claim, namely that a credible
account of well-being will take into account
neurodiversity.
WELL-BEING IN PRACTICE
Considerations of well-being confront us in a
number of different ways and in a number of every-
day contexts and practices. A paradigmatic case
here is friendship. It is typical of at least some prac-
tices of friendship to enquire about one’s friend’s
well-being. ‘How are you?’ we may ask our friend
with some concern, or we may ask of a mutual
acquaintance, ‘How is she doing these days?’
Sometimes, it is not even necessary to ask. We
simply pick up from her looks, her behaviour or
her reactions how well or badly a person is doing.
Our everyday interest in well-being does not of
course limit itself to our friends’ well-being. We
may, for one, be interested in our own well-being,
or in that of our children, or, according to the
social roles that we may happen to occupy, in the
well-being of our students, our patients, our
employees or the members of our constituency.
The speciﬁc roles or practices that we enact make
relevant certain aspects of well-being rather than
others and direct our attention towards them.ii
Hence, the quality and intensity of a patient’s pain,
what conditions this pain may indicate and what
activities this pain may impede may prompt a
doctor to recommend surgical intervention.
Similarly, a politician should be interested in those
aspects of citizens’ well-being, such as safety in the
streets and levels of public health provisions that
are considered to be the proper object of political
action.iii
A couple of important features can be read off
from these examples of everyday practices. First,
they are action-oriented or practical. Hence, your
iWe should note that we do not consistently refer to
‘autistic people’ or ‘people with autism’: there is a current
controversy about which usage is preferable, which for
reasons of space we take no stance on here, and instead
try to use both variants without implying a preference.
iiSee Rodogno1 (p50–55) for a discussion of the notion of
an aspect of well-being.
iiiThough, of course, some will dispute that such
considerations are ultimately relevant to political action in
connection to citizens’ well-being as much as they are
relevant in connection to their rights and freedoms.
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interest in your friend’s well-being is typically accompanied by
some preparedness on your behalf to help her, if that were indeed
necessary and appropriate. If you systematically failed to be moti-
vated to do so, it would be legitimate for someone to doubt the
authenticity of your friendship. Second, the scope and nature of
well-being interventions, and, hence the aspects of well-being that
are taken to be the relevant targets of intervention, are at least in
part determined by the nature of the practice in its cultural decli-
nations. Hence, the fact that autonomy is highly valued in a
certain cultural context places limits on what courses of action
are considered as appropriate forms of helping one’s friends in
that context. On many occasions, it may turn out that the best
thing for you to do is simply to ‘be there for your friend’ and
offer moral support rather than actively changing his or her life.
The starting point of this paper, and, in fact, the experience
that has quite literally started our recent thinking on this topic,
is another well-being-centred practice, namely parenting and, in
particular, the parenting of autistic children. In what follows, we
will not say much about either parenting as such, or about the
parenting of autistic children in particular. We believe, however,
that the latter experience has been instrumental in gaining an
external perspective on how well-being is typically studied in
philosophical practice. From this perspective, we uncovered
some of the hidden assumptions that regulate this practice and,
as we hope to show, were somewhat able to correct for some of
its blind spots. This is ultimately instrumental for both the study
of well-being and autism and the study of well-being tout court.
For our purposes, let us agree that children’s well-being does
play a central role in our parenting practices, where this claim is
to be articulated as follows. When choosing on behalf of their
children, parents usually choose with their children’s present
and future well-being in view, with the aim of equipping them
with whatever skills are most useful for living a good life, and
the deep-seated hope that they will have a good life. When
parents choose with apparent disregard for their children’s well-
being, it would be legitimate to call upon them to justify their
choice. Only weightier moral reasons, necessity or justiﬁable
ignorance are considered as good justiﬁcations. The claim is not
that the child’s well-being is the only norm regulating parenting
but that it is a fundamental norm. Sure enough, most parents
also want their children to grow up into (morally) good people
but they will at the same time hope that their children have lives
in which being good does not come in deep or systematic con-
ﬂict with their well-being.
But what does the well-being that parents have in view when
they choose on behalf of their children exactly consist in? We
wonder how many parents have asked themselves this question
or, perhaps more moderately, how many parents have asked
themselves this question and found answers that involved chan-
ging much to what they were already doing in connection with
their parenting. This should not necessarily be interpreted as a
critical remark. Whether correct or otherwise, for all we know,
most parents may typically take themselves to be doing whatever
any parent ought to be doing, where this involves heavily
relying on social structures, such as schools, religious organisa-
tions and those organisations that provide security and eco-
nomic opportunities, as well as those practices, such as
etiquette, that are meant to socialise one’s child.
Whatever the context, the question still remains: what do
these parents actually take good lives, the lives they wish their
children to have, to consist in? Unfortunately, we do not have
an answer to this question because no systematic (and cross-
cultural) effort to collect this type of information has, to our
knowledge, been made, and because, as suggested above, there
may well be no articulated answer to this question in the ﬁrst
place: many parents simply follow whatever positive practices
and rely on whatever structures are in place in their society
without much further thought.
From our experience as parents and individuals who talk to
other parents, however, we can easily imagine that in modern soci-
eties, at least some parents adopt for their children some rather
open-ended models of the good life. On these models, what
parents wish for their children is often that they ‘ﬁnd happiness’,
where this would typically be found in having an interesting and
well-remunerated job, good friends, a loving partner with whom
to start a family, and in having a life free from debilitating sickness
and long enough to enjoy one’s grandchildren. Let us call this
model the Standard Model and hope that it does indeed capture
the view of many, if not most, people in this context.
Just as inhabiting a poverty-stricken or war-stricken society
may lead some parents no longer to rely on the (quickly disap-
pearing or inexistent) structures and possibilities afforded by
their society, while at the same time holding on to whatever
model of the good life they may have had, parenting a child
with autism may lead parents to question whatever model of the
good life they may have had and, thereby, those structures and
practices in one’s society whose point could be taken to be,
entirely or in part, the realisation of this model.
To illustrate, consider how children with autism (but not only
them) often engage in self-stimulatory behaviour (or ‘stimming’
as it is sometimes referred to), that is, repetitive body movements
or repetitive movements of objects. The former may include
rocking back and forth, hand-ﬂapping, humming and grunting,
echolalia and repeating portions of videos, books or songs at
inappropriate times. The latter may include turning on and off
light switches. Clearly many of these behaviours will be consid-
ered as inappropriate, if not disruptive, in many contexts and,
importantly, in those contexts such as schools, in which children
are supposedly building up skills instrumental to their future
well-being. What is more, such behaviours will typically lead to
stigmatisation. Letting the child freely enact them will in the end
lead to his or her social isolation, a lack of training of those social
skills that may already be in deﬁcit in the autistic child and ultim-
ately to lowering his or her current and future opportunities to
enjoy many of the goods on the Standard Model.
Some of these behaviours may perhaps be trained away.
Training, however, comes at a cost in terms of the current well-
being of the child, for any time spent training such behaviours
away is time that might have been used on activities of greater
immediate beneﬁt to the child. This trade-off is even more
momentous in the case of autism when we consider that training
some of these behaviours away may be a particularly difﬁcult
and long process. Even more importantly, however, it is by no
means clear that training these traits away is of longer-term
beneﬁt to the autistic child. It may therefore be completely mis-
guided to conceptualise the situation as a trade-off, less immedi-
ate well-being in favour of greater longer-term well-being.
Whether there would be any reason to do so depends on
whether we could safely assume that the Standard Model, or
something sufﬁciently similar to it, could apply to adults with
autism as well as neurotypicals.
We doubt that this assumption can safely be made. Consider,
for one, what Jim Sinclair, a well-known autism-rights activist
and himself autistic, has to say:
Autism is a way of being. It is pervasive; it colors every experi-
ence, every sensation, perception, thought, emotion, and encoun-
ter, every aspect of existence. It is not possible to separate the
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autism from the person--and if it were possible, the person you’d
have left would not be the same person you started with.iv
Within the autism community, this is not an isolated view.
Reading autobiographies by autistic individuals, browsing rele-
vant websites such as wrongplanet.net or autreat.com and inter-
acting with autistic people at the network meetings we organisev
only conﬁrms that this view is indeed common. For our pur-
poses, however, the next passage is even more revealing. As
Sinclair tackles the question of ‘normal’ parent-to-autistic child
relations, he writes:
You try to relate as parent to child, using your own understand-
ing of normal children, your own feelings about parenthood,
your own experiences and intuitions about relationships. And the
child doesn’t respond in any way you can recognize as being part
of that system.
That does not mean the child is incapable of relating at all. It
only means you’re assuming a shared system, a shared under-
standing of signals and meanings, that the child in fact does not
share. It’s as if you tried to have an intimate conversation with
someone who has no comprehension of your language. Of
course the person won’t understand what you’re talking about,
won’t respond in the way you expect, and may well ﬁnd the
whole interaction confusing and unpleasant.
It takes more work to communicate with someone whose native
language isn’t the same as yours. And autism goes deeper than
language and culture; autistic people are ‘foreigners’ in any
society. You’re going to have to give up your assumptions about
shared meanings. You’re going to have to learn to back up to
levels more basic than you’ve probably thought about before, to
translate, and to check to make sure your translations are under-
stood. You’re going to have to give up the certainty that comes of
being on your own familiar territory, of knowing you’re in
charge, and let your child teach you a little of her language,
guide you a little way into his world.vi
We think there may be something worthy of further articula-
tion in Sinclair’s idea that ‘autism goes deeper than language
and culture’, which can in fact be grasped by returning to the
idea of the pervasiveness of autism. Different cultures may well
fail to have a shared language and shared meanings. Yet the eth-
nographers that do ﬁeld work on different cultures work from
the assumption that the individuals they observe, at some basic
psychological level, function just like anybody else. No matter
how much culture can colour our perceptions and conceptual
schemes, these will be built on psychological bases that are
pretty much assumed to be pan-human. We know today that
this assumption is only partly true. There may be genetic differ-
ences among populations that inﬂuence the working of the
brain as well as cultural inﬂuences that in turn affect our neu-
ropsychology.vii Autism, however, introduces neuropsychological
differences that go well beyond, or ‘deeper’ than, the differences
in language and meaning that ethnographers may expect to
encounter.viii
Now if being autistic is so pervasive and to some extent
foreign to ‘normal’ perspectives, it can only be wise to approach
the question of autism and well-being with epistemic humility,
that is, by suspecting that a good autistic life may not necessarily
consist in the same things as it does for neurotypical individuals.
At that point, however, some difﬁcult questions arise: What
does a good life, or the best possible life, for an individual with
autism consist in? And how do we go about answering that
question? Should we take our start from neurotypical models
and then add and subtract features and goods? If so, by way of
what criteria? Should we ﬁnd common denominators, say, pleas-
ure and pain, and assume that at bottom these are the things
that matter prudentially to everyone?
Besides being important practical questions for some parents
and their children, these are also philosophical questions. We
may therefore want to turn to philosophy in search of an
answer, but, alas, to no much avail. In what follows, we will
brieﬂy elucidate why current philosophical practice cannot as it
stands offer much help with regard to these questions and indi-
cate some of the directions that the study of well-being should
take in order to ﬁnd some answers.
THE LIMITS OF THE CURRENT PHILOSOPHY OF
WELL-BEING
Current philosophical theories of well-being such as hedonism,
desire satisfaction theory, objective list theories and perfection-
ism share the same underlying method or approach. In this
section, we sketch this approach and then ﬁnd fault with it. Our
concern is not with these theories themselves, but with a speciﬁc
step in their approach that betrays a lack of sensitivity to the
particular issues that the case of autism brings to the table. This
is to say that any of these theories may in principle be correct if
and when the relevant methodological faults were redressed,
and in the section following this one, we propose one way of
doing just that.
Philosophical theorising on well-being can be viewed as a
three-step process. Step 1 consists in bringing forth the data that
the theory is then to systematise. While some philosophers
make this step quite explicit, think, for example, about
Aristotle’s review of the endoxa in Book I Chapter 5 of the
Nicomachean Ethicsix or Wayne Sumner’s reference to core and
peripheral ‘pre-theoretical beliefs’ or ‘pre-analytic convictions’
about well-being, most philosophers simply take some data for
granted.x The data, then, consist in pre-theoretical ideas and
intuitions about the goods to be had in certain ways of life or
the substantive sources of well-being, that is, kinds of experi-
ences, of interactions and conditions of one’s life (eg, eating a
good meal, having a family, doing sport, reading novels,
meeting with friends, having an interesting job, helping others,
climbing a mountain, achieving recognition in some ﬁeld) that
are believed by the theorists to capture both common sense as
well as, perhaps, more considered views about this topic.
Step 2 consists in constructing categories, or categorial goods,
out of the data selected in step 1. The outcome of this step is
generally a list of potential substantive goods that typically
includes pleasure and the absence of pain, achievement, virtue,
autonomy, deep personal relations, meaningful knowledge and
understanding, aesthetic appreciation, happiness and rational
activity. For example, it may be that sources of well-being such
ivSinclair.2 With fellow autistics Kathy Lissner Grant and Donna
Williams, Jim Sinclair formed Autism Network International (ANI) in
1992, the ﬁrst online network of this kind. Many thanks to Felix
Munch for the reference and for the many insights into autism.
vRodogno is co-founder and co-director of autism@aarhus, a network
whose purpose is to abridge the distance between autism research and
autism communities.
viSinclair.2
viiSee Han et al.3 for a recent critical review of Cultural Neuroscience.
viiiQuote recent piece on neuropsychological diversity in autism. But
also some more phenomenological accounts?
ixAristotle (ref. 4 pp. 1731–1732).
xSumner (ref. 5 pp. 10–20). See also Haybron (ref. 6, Ch.1) for a richer
description of current methodology in the philosophy of well-being.
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as eating a good meal and reading a good novel should be con-
sidered here under the category of pleasure (and the absence of
pain).
Step 3 may take different forms depending on the theorist’s
leanings and it is at this point that different kinds of theory take
shape. Most broadly two kinds of theories are put forward: sub-
stantive and formal. Substantive theories aim at enumerating the
ultimate prudential goods. In practice, much of the argument
among substantive theorists is an exchange between hedonism,
that is, the view that pleasure or enjoyment is the only categorial
good, on the one hand, and Objective List theories, that is,
views according to which there are a number of irreducible pru-
dential goods, on the other.xi
The aim of formal theories is to identify the one property
that all the goods from step 2, and in fact, all the sources of
well-being identiﬁed in step 1 have in common, or, perhaps,
ought on reﬂection to have in common. Formal theories will in
other words explain why or in virtue of what something is
indeed a prudential good. Hence, on desire fulﬁlment views,
what makes pleasant states or activities good for you is ultim-
ately the fact that you desire them (or would desire them if
rationale). Similarly, for some perfectionists only those activities
that perfect human nature are to count as good for us.
It is at this point useful to illustrate the way in which philoso-
phers argue for one theory as opposed to the other and, hence,
the structure of their disagreement. Ideally, formal and substan-
tive disagreements will be straightened out in reﬂective equilib-
rium. That is, our theories of well-being will converge as the
inferences we can draw from them are made to cohere with our
considered judgements and deeply held intuitions about well-
being. The problem, however, is that there are fundamental dis-
agreements about a number of deeply held intuitions about
well-being. Hence, for example, while some take well-being to
be essentially or conceptually subjective, others do not.xii
Similarly, while some take well-being to be essentially or concep-
tually mentalistic, others do not.xiii Finally, some philosophers
enter the discussion with very ﬁrm intuitions about the scope of
the concept of well-being. Hence, for example, cases in which
we seriously compromise our health, our ambitions and even
our life for the sake of someone else are portrayed as by deﬁn-
ition cases in which we sacriﬁce our well-being.xiv If on a given
theory of well-being the option that seems intuitively to be self-
sacriﬁcial is described as the better option for the agent, then
that theory is to be rejected as having a ‘scope problem’, that is,
as extending the idea of well-being to conceptual spaces that are
beyond its intuitive scope.
These dialectics are important to our present purposes as they
reveal how philosophers enter the study of well-being with prede-
termined substantive and conceptual ideas about well-being.
Substantively, their theories can only systematise whatever material
is taken to be relevant in the ﬁrst place, that is, in step 1. What is
more, some philosophers will only take some of this initial
material to be relevant in accordance to abstract conceptual
requirements, such as subjectivism and mentalism.xv This explains
why current philosophy is of little help in answering the questions
that concern us. The autistic perspective is simply absent from the
start and hence not systematised into theory. In order to include
this perspective, we would have to be in possession of common
sense and, perhaps, considered judgements about what kinds of
activities or states are good and bad for individuals with autism.
Or, to put it in the language of the philosophers, we would have
to have ‘pre-theoretical beliefs’ or ‘intuitions’ about autistic well-
being be they ‘central’ or ‘peripheral’; or again, we would have to
be in possession of the relevant endoxa. But this is precisely what
we were lacking and why we turned to the philosophy of well-
being in the ﬁrst instance.
Any attempt to incorporate the autistic perspective into the
current philosophical approach raises some fundamental ques-
tions about the approach itself, not only in its application to the
autism case, but in its ordinary employment. Consider what
incorporating this perspective would require. We would need to
understand what kind of things, events, feelings, activities or
pursuits, persons, and so on make a positive contribution to the
lives of individuals with autism and what kinds of things do not.
On the current approach, this information would form the basis
of step 1. But how does one get this information in the case of
autism or in the case of neurodiversity more in general? And, in
fact, how does one gather this information in the standard case?
In other words, by what processes do we come to form ‘pre-
theoretical beliefs’ or ‘intuitions’ about well-being or the rele-
vant Aristotelian endoxa? This is a basic but neglected epistemo-
logical question. While we would not be able to say what the
dominant philosophical stance on this issue would be, we do
suspect that a number of different stances would be defended.
While at one hand of the spectrum we would expect some phi-
losophers to call forth the idea that these intuitions and beliefs
are a priori, at the other hand of the spectrum, we would
expect empiricist answers such as J.S. Mill’s according to whom
the only evidence we have that something is good for us is the
fact that we desire it.xvi
The case of autism suggests that the information that constitu-
tes this ﬁrst step is not something we can simply assume but
rather something that needs to be carefully collected. Given the
neurodiversity involved by autism, we cannot simply rely on
assumptions about ‘people’s pre-reﬂective intuitions’ on well-
being or on what we think people typically desire, not even
when these intuitions and desires are reﬁned by way of reﬂec-
tion and rational exchange. Much more work than usually sus-
pected goes into collecting these data, and, what is more, this
work raises a number of difﬁcult methodological and epistemo-
logical questions:
How do we gather this information? Do we literally ask people
with autism? Given the diversity of people on the autistic spec-
trum, are there some individuals that are more representative
than others and whose views should be given more weight? If we
decide to ask people with autism, what exactly would we be
asking and with what wording? How do we make sure that thexiThose who defend Objective List theories disagree about what the
goods on the list are. See Fltecher (ref. 7, p. 149) for a quick
comparison of different objective lists.
xiiTo say that well-being is subjective is to say that something is
potentially good/bad for x only if x has a pro/con attitude towards it.
xiiiMentalism about well-being involves the belief that only mental states
(that subjects are conscious or aware of) can potentially contribute to
well-being.
xivSee Darwall’s discussion of Tarzan’s decision to leave Jane with
Clayton (ref. 8, pp. 22–25) and his discussion of the Sheila example
(2002, pp. 43–49).
xvIt is in turn interesting to know how these conceptual requirements
enter the picture. Are these linguistic intuitions that philosophers have
on the basis of (extrapolate from exposure to) certain substantive views
of well-being or are they supposed to arise independently of the latter
but by contrasting the role that the concept of well-being or prudential
goodness plays in language with concepts in its vicinity such as moral
goodness and perfection?
xviMill (ref. 9, IV.3).
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question is not skewed, i.e., a question more appropriately to be
asked to neurotypicals? What about those who cannot express
themselves? Would it be legitimate to ask the relevant question/s
to those who take care of them instead or would that reintroduce
an illegitimate neurotypical perspective? Should our method be
quantitative or qualitative? Should we rather/also employ ethno-
graphic methods involving observation and interpretation?
Should the ethnographer herself be autistic? What is the ethnog-
rapher to take as evidence that the presence of a certain person,
activity, feeling, state, etc., in a person’s life is good/bad for that
person?
These are difﬁcult methodological questions, which cannot
properly be treated in a short space. In what follows, we will,
however, sketch a proposal, not so much as an ultimate solution
but as a contender eventually to be tested against others, which
will answer some of these questions.xvii
SKETCHING A NEW APPROACH
As presented above, the current approach ultimately aims at pro-
viding answers to distinct though connected kinds of questions,
namely what kind of things are ultimate prudential goods and
why, or in virtue of what, are these things prudential goods. Let
us call these questions prudential questions. Our initial question
is quite different from this and more directly action-oriented.
We are looking to understand what model/s of the good life, if
any, those who take care of autistic individual should employ in
order to orient their well-being interventions. The prudential
question and the action-oriented question, however, are con-
nected, for, presumably, models of the good life may be
informed by theoretical reﬂection of the prudential kind.
Hence, one may, for example, maintain that the good life will
be the one that contains the right balance of those ultimate
goods speciﬁed in one’s Objective List.
Yet, as argued above, the current approach cannot as it stands
afford an answer to our practical question. The problem lies in
step 1 and is an epistemological one. We must gather autism-
relevant information about well-being and ill-being and there
are difﬁcult questions concerning how to go about doing that.
We also argued that on the current approach this is not simply a
problem connected to the case of autism but one that affects the
study of well-being in general. The disagreements among theor-
ies of well-being at the level of step 3 are ultimately based on
fundamental substantive and conceptual disagreements that go
back to step 1. In what follows, then, we will propose a new
general epistemology of well-being, which, with some caveats,
can ultimately be applied to the case of autism and hence be
used to answer our initial question.
In line with the approach sketched in section ‘Well-being in
practice’, we claim that well-being is best studied in its context,
that is, those everyday practices that it animates. In these con-
texts, we are typically concerned with whether this or that
person is doing well or badly, with the possibility of action or
intervention in view. Figuring out how well someone is doing is,
at least initially, a different exercise from asking the rather more
abstract prudential questions presented in the previous section,
which are the philosophers’ typical entry point in this
discussion.
Now on the practice-based approach, in order to understand
how well a person is doing, we need next to answer an epis-
temological question: what kind of information is to count as
evidence that someone is doing well or badly? As argued else-
where,10 on one interpretation of the relevant practices, we
should take happiness and unhappiness to be our main epi-
stemic channel to answer to our well-being question.
This clearly requires defending an account of happiness. On
the one endorsed here, happiness is an emotional condition
very much in line with Dan Haybron’s idea of psychic ﬂour-
ishing.xviii Happiness is here to be understood as being made up
of two components, namely central affective states, as opposed
to peripheral ones; and a person’s mood propensity, or dispos-
ition to experience moods. To elaborate: while peripheral effect
includes purely physical, seemingly emotionless pleasures and
pains—an itch, eating a cracker, seeing an attractive building,
noting with approval that some distant stranger got rich in the
lottery—central affective states include moods (eg, anxiety) and
mood-constituting emotions (eg, sadness and joy). The idea of a
mood propensity may be illustrated by the case of an emotion-
ally fragile widow who, while quite cheerful at the moment,
may easily and somewhat unexpectedly break down into tears.
In short, happiness on such view is more nearly the opposite of
depression, anxiety and irritability, whereas hedonistic happiness
is simply opposed to pleasantness.
The central affective states involved in happiness consist
rather in three different modes of response, corresponding to
different types of evaluations. At the most basic level, there are
states of tranquillity versus anxiety. The root idea here concerns
being psychically at home or secure in one’s life. Haybron calls
this dimension of happiness attunement. Assuming one’s situ-
ation is secure, the next question is whether it merits investment
or effort. There are two sorts of positive response here: vitality
and ﬂow, where the latter is opposed to boredom, and the
former involves a state of energy or enthusiasm. This dimension
of happiness is here called engagement. Those who are
depressed, besides being sad, lack precisely the type of hearty
engagement with their life described here. They are disengaged
and withdrawn. The ﬁnal dimension is the one that is perhaps
most studied, namely endorsement. Its prototypical emotions
involve states of feeling happy or sad, cheerful and irritable.
Happiness, on Haybron’s view, is a sort of psychic afﬁrmation
or ﬂourishing that involves the positive responses of these three
dimensions.
Our claim is that when we are trying to understand whether
someone (even oneself ) is doing well or badly, we typically con-
sider information about her un/happiness to be relevant and, in
fact, the main epistemic channel available. Hence, if you looked
depressed, or extremely anxious, or extremely irritable, or just
rather sad all the time, we would dismiss as likely untrue any
claim to the effect that you are doing well, even if it came from
you. This, however, is not to say that un/happiness responses
are infallible guides, for they may well fail to be grounded as,
for example, when our perceptions are not veridical or our
psyche generally out of balance.xix
So far we have argued that a person’s un/happiness is the
main source of evidence for how well/badly she is doing. It
follows that understanding what typically makes a person’s un/
happy (what a person’s un/happiness is a reaction to) should
take us closer to understanding what constitutes this person’s
well-being. Our thesis is that un/happiness is a reaction to the
perceived fate of our attachments. In what follows, we will most
xviiThis proposal is an adaption of work that has in part appeared in
Rodogno.1
xviiiHaybron (ref. 6, pp. 105–151). In this and the following paragraph,
we draw heavily from Rodogno (ref. 1, p. 438).
xixThese are issues treated in Rodogno (ref. 1, p. 443–444).
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brieﬂy unpack this thesis before considering how it applies to
the case of autism.
First, a few words about attachments. These are here under-
stood as persistent forms of valuing that consist of patterns of
dispositions including (i) cognitions, (ii) normative cognitions,
(iii) affective responses and (iv) motivations. We may be attached
to all sorts of things: persons, including oneself, values and
ideals, including self-ideals, objects, activities and pursuits,
including careers and hobbies. Hence, for example, if you are
attached to a certain activity, say, basketball, which you pursue
as either a hobby or as career, you will be attentive to informa-
tion relative to it (ie, occasions for playing, teams now hiring,
facts about other players) and will cognise some of this informa-
tion in normative terms (ie, the fact that one of your favoured
teams is playing in town is a reason for you to buy a ticket); you
will also be emotionally affected in ways in which you would
not otherwise be. Hence, you may feel pride at scoring a par-
ticularly important and beautiful basket or shame if your team
lost badly against a poor opponent. Finally, you will typically be
motivated to act in accordance to your normative cognitions
and emotions (ie, buy the tickets, express your pride and do
whatever it takes to avoid humiliating defeats).
Note that on this theory attachments do not as such constitute
a person’s well-being. They are rather preconditions for, both,
the well-being and ill-being of a person. It is the fate of the
attachment that ultimately determines or constitutes the
person’s well-being. Your un/happiness is a response to (signals)
how you perceive your attachment to be doing. So if basketball
playing is one of your attachments, you will be happy to the
extent to which you perceive your attachment to be fulﬁlling
your expectations, wishes and hopes. Your happiness is evi-
dence, although defeasible evidence, that you are doing well,
that is, that something that matters for you is indeed going in
the right direction. Similarly, a career-threatening injury may
cause you a lot of anxiety and perhaps depression. Your unhap-
piness will be evidence that you are not doing so well, at least
when it comes to this hobby or career.
Closer study, via happiness, of the nature of human attach-
ments will feed well-being relevant information into step 1. In
the next steps, theorists may then be able to systematise this
material in a small number of categories or categorial goods,
and, perhaps even those categorial goods familiar to Objective
List theorists (attachments that are about deep personal relations
or are primarily animated by the idea of enjoyment or achieve-
ment). This list of goods, however, would be built not on the
basis of a priori intuitions about the nature of prudential good-
ness, and not even on the basis of people’s desires, but rather
through a process of interpretation and inference from the
praxis of attachment.
TOWARDS A NEURODIVERSE PHILOSOPHY OF WELL-BEING
Given the bottom-up nature of the approach, the categorial
goods delivered by this process should be understood as generali-
sations that may well apply to people across contexts, while
falling short of being universal. On this approach, we should
expect, and can allow, that some individuals or groups, given
their peculiar histories and/or psychologies, may not (be able to)
have the same kind of attachments as the majority of people in
their society or even as the majority of groups across societies.
We should in other words expect that contextual features such as
the particular social and physical environment in which indivi-
duals ﬁnd themselves as well as the psychological features of
these individuals may have an impact on the nature and structure
of their attachments. This is obviously good news for an
approach to the study of well-being that wants to accommodate
autism and neurodiversity more in general. On this approach, the
theory would not be bound by neurotypical substantive a priori
intuitions or patterns of desire about prudential goodness, nor
would we be able to force onto our initial material perfectionistic
views of ‘human’ nature that treat neurodiverse well-being as
something other, if not lesser, than human well-being.xx
While promising, this approach is still to deliver a clear
answer to our practical problem: what model of the good life
should parents of autistic children adopt in order to guide their
well-being interventions? First, note that this approach can at
least in principle fail to deliver anything that is general enough
to be called a model. On this approach, the study of autistic
well-being would begin by gathering information about which
activities, structures, situations, relations, and so on tend to gen-
erate happiness and unhappiness. Those involved in this study
can use all relevant means: directly observe autistic individuals
in their daily lives; autobiographies; the accounts of those who
live in close contact with autistic individuals and who may well
have an idea about the happiness and unhappiness of the people
they take care of; the relevant websites and other ﬁrst-person
accounts that can be certiﬁed as originating from autistic indivi-
duals. In what kind of activities do autistic individuals ﬁnd
security, engagement, ﬂow? Is there something common to these
activities? Is it a sense of structure or predictability?
It is an open question whether an enquiry such as this does in
the end deliver material apt to systematisation into a model. We
are quite conﬁdent, however, that the notion of unhappiness
that we employ, with its emphasis on anxiety, depression and
irritability, is particularly relevant here as it is an unfortunate
thread in the life of many autistic individuals.xxi On the basis of
that, we speculate that the approach may therefore more likely
deliver models of ill-being as opposed to models of well-being
or the good life. That, however, would still count as
progress.xxii
This is all the more so when we keep in mind that, from a
practical point of view, even models such as the Standard Model
provide only very rough guidance. While pointing at a general
xxDan Russell (ref. 11, p. 5) comes close to sporting such a view. Russell
insists that part of what matters about well-being, which he calls
‘happiness’, is being fulﬁlled as opposed to merely ﬁnding fulﬁlment.
The former idea makes a reference to some notion of humanity, which,
for example, essentially includes the capacity to love others. Hence:
“Someone incapable of loving others [or emotionally childish]… might
have a life that is fulﬁlling for him as it can be, given that unique
make-up of his, but we would not point to his life as a good example of
happiness. (It’s certainly no life one would wish on a friend). If that is
so, then we can understand happiness only by keeping in view that it is
happiness for humans that we are talking about.” So, if as a human
being you happen to have a unique make-up that makes you
‘emotionally childish’, you will not be able to be fulﬁlled and have a
good (‘happy’) human life. This is a kind of result that we hope our
approach can avoid.
xxiIt may be objected that our affect-based epistemology could not be
applied to an autistic population with a 40–65% incidence of
alexithymia (a subclinical condition characterised by difﬁculties in
identifying and describing one’s own emotional state) (in ‘normal’
population, the incidence is 10%) (Berthoz and Hill;12 Hill et al.13 Yet,
to our knowledge, there is no evidence that autistic individuals are less
capable of affective states such as depression, anxiety and irritability.
What is more, such states are generally observable by third parties, at
least those that are acquainted with the subjects, and measurable by
well-established psychometric tools. This is an advantage of this
approach as it is applied to non-verbal and cognitively impaired autistic
individuals.
xxiiSee Mercier et al. (2000)17 for a good illustration of the kind of
qualitative evidence that we have in mind here.
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direction, they are silent about what each individual, given her
speciﬁc (social, historical, psychological) circumstances, ought
prudentially to choose or to have in order to live a good life.
That is true also of more philosophically reﬁned versions of these
models, such as we could consider hedonism or Objective List
theories to be. Hence, for example, on the assumption that
hedonism were true, each individual would still have to ﬁgure
out what things were sources of pleasure for her and, in fact, how
large the positive balance of pleasure over pain in her life should
be in order for her to have a good life.xxiii The details would be
even more difﬁcult to ﬁgure out if we worked under the assump-
tion that there was an irreducible plurality of prudential goods.
We would in that case have the difﬁcult task of ﬁnding out what
combination of these goods is good enough or best for one.
From a practical point of view, then, it is necessary to comple-
ment these models. What is missing is for each individual to
conduct, and thereby have the freedom to conduct, his or her
own ‘experiments in living’.xxiv This is a trial-and-error process in
which, once again, happiness and unhappiness will be our guides.
Whatever attachments we choose (or happen to have) may or may
not turn out to be good for us. While in the act of choice, we can
rely on the expertise of competent judges, that is, individuals who
have experienced the options one is facing, and can distil useful
and informed advice about them, but in the end, it is through the
experience of happiness and unhappiness that we learn what par-
ticular attachments make prudential sense for each one of us.
These points apply pari passu to the case of autism. Even if
we could arrive at some models, some signiﬁcant details would
have to be ﬁlled out by the individuals or by those who take
decisions on their behalf, by way of experiments in living. In the
case of autism, however, and for the time being, it is not pos-
sible to rely on the advice of competent judges because there are
simply too few of them and because it is more difﬁcult to make
their expertise available to others.xxv What is more, we cannot
simply assume that the normal structures and social praxes in
place in a society can be trusted as helping to secure the child’s
(immediate and/or future) well-being. There will hence be much
more experimenting with untrodden paths whose twist and
turns are unknown and hence risky.
For example, and going back to the parenting of autistic chil-
dren, rather than assuming that the child will simply be inter-
ested or uninterested in normal paths of socialisation as it
happens in mainstream schools, if at all possible, there is going
to have to be an exploration of the child’s potential for social-
isation in typical society. This would involve experimenting with
such socialisation to various degrees while closely monitoring
the child’s levels of anxiety, irritability, if not depression.
Academic research, when properly conducted, may provide
useful input here. In a recent study of autistic children aged 9–11
in mainstream schools, for example, Calder et al (ref. 15,
pp. 309–10), observe that:
…there was much variability in the extent and nature of these
children’s friendships. Some children were considered central to
high-status classroom social network and had stable reciprocal
friendships veriﬁed by a number of sources. Others had links to
one or two lower status members of the class group. Others still
were on the periphery of their peer group, with some showing
little interest in interacting with other children of their age.
Importantly, no child with autism was completely socially iso-
lated, unlike some other children in their classes. Motivation
emerged as a key factor in parents’ and teachers’ perceptions of
these differences. Children also appeared to beneﬁt from direct
support to develop their friendship skills.
Different children have different levels of involvement in
friendship and the child’s level of motivation pretty much
explains why this is so. Yet, a parent may want to understand
what one’s child level of motivation is and whether this level
should be taken as basic or is in turn to be explained by other
factors, such as the child’s development of social skills or the
sensory issues that she may have and that may become a hin-
drance in the presence of several other children.xxvi Answers to
these questions may only be had by trying out several options, if
indeed one is as lucky as having several options to choose from.
Interestingly, by studying what they call the quality of friend-
ship, Calder et al conclude that, compared with their classroom
peers of similar age and ability, children with autism perceive
friendship in somewhat different terms. In particular, compared
with their non-autistic peers, they rated their best friendships
lower with regard to those dimensions of friendship that have to
do with assistance and protection (‘help’), and acceptance, valid-
ation and attachment (‘closenesss’), but just as high as their peers
with regard to dimensions such as ‘companionship’ (eg, “My
friend and I spend a lot of our free time together”). In short, the
picture that emerges from this study is a rather nuanced one:
while most children with autism are socially interested, they are
variably so, and their understanding of praxes such as friendship
is not necessarily like that of their peers. The ‘socialising’ and
‘being together’ that adds to an autistic’s quality of life might not
quite have the same nature as what mainstream society would
have it. When parents try to picture a model of the good autistic
life, this is something they should consider.
CONCLUSION
By thinking about the issue of autism and well-being from the
action-oriented perspective of a parent, we have learnt a few
important lessons. For one, we were in a position to observe
one signiﬁcant shortcoming of much current philosophy of well-
being. Most philosophers today take too uncritical a stance with
regard to the well-being data that they go on to theorise. This
fact is particularly lamentable when we consider that these very
same philosophical theories form the theoretical background of
much current empirical science of well-being.xxvii This is not to
say that the current approach is to be discarded but that it
should be complemented by a more systematic epistemology of
well-being and, in particular, by an autism-sensitive or
neurodiverse-sensitive epistemology.
We have sketched a new approach to the study of well-being
that takes its start in precisely such an epistemology. While on
this approach we are not in a position to offer much substantive
guidance to parents from the armchair, we are indeed in a pos-
ition to tell parents what to do to obtain substantive knowledge
about autistic well-being. In short, guided by their children and
the competent judges’ experience with happiness and
xxiiiRodogno1 expresses scepticism with regard to the possibility that the
aggregate of a person’s pleasure minus pain is a mental state, and one
that is accessible to that person (or anyone else).
xxivThis expression comes from J.S. Mill’s On Liberty (ref. 14, III.1).
xxvThe spread of internet communities for autists is a sign that things
may be changing for the better in this department.
xxviCalder et al (ref. 15, pp. 310–311) provide evidence against the
claim that autistic children’s verbal and non-verbal ability and their
mentalising skills might be potential sources of variation in the extent to
which these children can sustain friendships.
xxviiThis is a point discussed in Rodogno.16
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unhappiness, parents will gain greater insight into what things
can become signiﬁcant attachments for their children and hence
which ‘normal’ structures and praxes can and cannot be instru-
mental to or constitutive of their children’s well-being.
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